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Abstract Two speculative strategies  within the European Monetary  System are empirically 
evaluated. The potential profitability of speculating on a currency's devaluation at a re- 
alignment crucially depends on being able to predict timing and magnitude of the parity 
change.  Such opportunity has been eliminated from the system since 1983.  For the 
reverse strategy of."borrowing low, investing high," the evidence since 1983 suggests 
significant profitable opportunities for the weaker EMS countries-Belgium,  Denmark, 
France and Italy-unconditional  on knowledge of the timing of realignments. We con- 
clude that this is due to a "peso problem" type of premium. 
In this paper we empirically  investigate some  important  economic  hy- 
potheses concerning the efficiency of financial markets in the EMS and 
the  possibility of speculative  gains  using  Euro-interest  and  exchange 
rates on a weekly basis over the period  1979-1990. 
We focus  on two  different  speculative  strategies,  both  of which  are 
often  discussed  in financial  markets.  Little empirical  evidence  exists, 
however, on the profitability of such strategies. 1 We add some new evi- 
dence,  evaluated from the point of view of a domestic (Dutch)  investor. 
The  first  strategy to  be  evaluated  concentrates  on  realignment  pe- 
riods  and  consists of borrowing  a  certain  amount  of a  fundamentally 
weak currency-say  Italian  lira-in  the  Euro-market,  converting  it to a 
fundamentally  strong currency-say  Dutch guilders-using  the current 
spot rate,  and  investing the  Dutch  guilder  amount  in Euro-guilder  de- 
posits with the  same  one-week  maturity  of the  Italian  lira loan. 2 After 
one week, during which the realignment  is expected to have occurred, 
the open  positions are closed.  Both the Euro-guilder  deposit and the 
Euro-lira loan mature and the investor can use the proceeds of the one 
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Of course,  without  a  realignment,  this  strategy  results  in  a  limited 
loss,  but in  case of a devaluation  of the weak currency the  potential 
gain is unlimited.  In Section 2 we empirically analyze the potential for 
making speculative  gains with this strategy. 
The  second  strategy  we  investigate  is  the  reverse  of the  first  one 
and  consists  of  borrowing  in  low  interest  currencies  like  the  guilder 
and  investing  the  borrowed  amount  in  high  interest  currencies  like 
the  lira.  Obviously,  the  best  times  to  implement  such  strategy  are 
when no realignments are expected for the near future.  The return on 
the strategy,  again,  is the sum  of the  interest  rate differential  and the 
exchange  rate gain.  As opposed to the former strategy, though, the a 
priori known interest rate differential  is now positive, yielding a positive 
return, while the return on the open position on foreign exchange is likely 
to be negative,  because,  on average, the lira,  in which the investor  is 
long, is expected to depreciate against the guilder, in which the investor 
is short.  Now, the downward risk to the investor is essentially unlimited 
and  the  maximum  positive  return  will  equal  the  interest  differential. 
The  empirical  investigation  of the  profitability  of this  strategy  occurs 
in Section 3. 
Before  turning  to  Sections  2  and  3  for  the  evaluation  of  the  two 
strategies,  we first  describe the data used  in this  study  in  Section  1. 
We  define  the  return  on  an  open  position  in  foreign  Euro-deposits 
and  present  summary  statistics  of the  return  data with  a  preliminary 
discussion.  Section 4 contains a summary and conclusions. 
1.  Data 
We use weekly quotations  of exchange  rates and 7-day  Euro-interest 
rates  3  from  Datastream,  starting  on  Wednesday,  April  4,  1979  and 
ending on Wednesday,  May 16, 1990.  All quotations are middle rates, 
i.e.  the  average  of  bid  and  offer  rates.  Transaction  costs  are  not 
taken  into  account.  In  our  calculations  we take the  Netherlands  as 
the benchmark country and express all exchange rates as the number 
of Dutch guilders  per unit of foreign  currency.  Weekly  exchange  rate 
changes are computed as the logarithmic growth rate of the exchange 
rate in percentages per week.  Correspondingly,  interest rates are also 
expressed  in percentages per week. 
Countries  included  in  the  analysis  are  the  Netherlands,  Germany, 
Belgium",  France,  Italy,  Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom,  although 
the  U.K.  was  not formally  involved  in  the  exchange  rate  mechanism 
of the  EMS  over the  sample  period.  Seven-day  Euro-rates  are  only 
available from January 1981 onward for Belgium and from August 1983 
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confined to the shorter period  for which data are available.  Ireland  is 
completely excluded from the analysis for lack of interest rate data. 
In many studies  of the  EMS, two sub-periods  are distinguished  re- 
garding the functioning  of the system.  The first  sub-period  is usually 
taken to start with the founding of the EMS in March  1979 and to end 
in  March  1983, when the last of a series  of realignments  took place. 
This period is characterized  by strong  deflationary  policies  in all coun- 
tries involved  in the EMS, though with different timing and at different 
speed,  and  by frequent  realignments  (seven) of the  central  EMS ex- 
change rates.  After  March  1983, realignments  become  less frequent 
and  smaller  in  magnitude.  Only five realignments  have taken  place 
between 1983 and the present.  The system appears to have stabilized. 
To assess  whether there  is  indeed  a difference  in the behaviour  of 
financial  markets  between these two sub-periods,  we both analyze the 
total  period  and  the  second  sub-period.  For convenience,  we take 
August  1983  as  the  breakpoint  between the  two sub-periods.  This 
way, the assumed  breakpoint coincides with the first available  Danish 
interest rate data.  Although our breakpoint is a few months off in timing 
compared with most of the literature, this is not crucial  for the results. 
We  define  the  excess  return  on  an  open  position  in  foreign  Euro- 
currency deposits in percentages  per week as: 
,-t =  [log(1  +  i;)  -  log(1  +  it)  +  •  10o,  (1) 
where et is the current spot exchange  rate in guilders  per unit of foreign 
currency,  it and i;" are nominal  7-day Euro-currency  rates on the Dutch 
guilder and the foreign  currency,  respectively,  in basis points  per week 
and et+l  refers to the exchange rate one week from today.  Under the 
null hypothesis of perfect capital  mobility and substitutability,  investors 
are indifferent  between guilder and foreign  currency deposits and rt is 
a white noise series with mean zero. 
Our first  approach  will  be to summarize  the statistical  behaviour  of 
the  return  rt  over time for each  of the  countries  involved  and  of  its 
two components,  the  realized  exchange  rate  return  and  the  interest 
differential.  Table 1 presents  a few summary statistics  of these vari- 
ables.  Moreover, the reported  t-statistic  tests whether the mean return 
significantly  deviates from zero, the S-statistic measures the degree of 
skewness and the  J-statistic  is a test on normality, s In Table 1A total 
returns  are  investigated  both for the whole period,  the whole period 
excluding  realignment  weeks and the second  sub-period.  A  number 
of interesting  results emerge. 
First,  normality of returns  is strongly rejected  for each  country over 
the whole sample.  Skewness  appears  to play a limited  role only,  but 
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Table 1A. Statistics for weekly returns  (% per week) 
I, Period April 1979-May 1990 (580 observations)  a 
mean  variance  skewness  kurtosis b  t-test  c  S-tes~  J-test  e 
FF  0.0254  0.2380  -4.769  54.53  1.25  2.07  66,366.74 
IL  0.0671  0.3151  -1.824  18.91  2.88  1.66  6,453.52 
DM  -0.0056  0.0634  0.253  8.12  -0.54  0.83  638.92 
BP  0.0347  1.2752  -0.287  4.72  0.74  1.66  79.77 
BF  0.0270  0.7088  0.169  9.45  0.71  0.54  847.93 
I1. Period April 1979-May 1990 (excluding 12 realignment weeks) (568 observations) 
mean  variance  skewness  kurtosis  t-test  S-test  J-test 
FF  0.0501  0.1241  0,116  9.75  3.39  0.67  1,078.24 
IL  0.0§13  0.2371  -0.419  10.53  4.47  1.17  1,359.04 
DM  -0.0067  0.0606  0.262  8.45  -0.65  0.84  708.27 
BP  0.0499  1.2636  -0.293  4.84  1.06  1.76  88.56 
BF  0.0368  0.6170  0.468  8.97  1.02  0.18  726.51 
III. Period August 1983-May 1990 (352 observations) 
mean  variance  skewness  kurtosis  t-test  S-test  J-test 
FF  0.0306  0.1123  -3.172  34.37  1.71  2.03  15,018.84 
IL  0.0608  0.1824  -2.165  15.83  2.67  1.17  2,687.94 
DM  -0.0124  0.0347  4.177  9.71  -1.24  0.85  661.33 
BP  -0.0133  1.1027  -0.280  4.78  -0.24  1.71  51.09 
BF  0.0437  0.2554  -0.174  7.20  1,62  0.53  260.69 
DK  0.0564  0.0934  -0.286  3.61  3.46  0.32  1034 
"  For Belgium, interest data are available from January 1981 only, giving 488 obser- 
vations.  Interest data for Denmark start in August 1983, yielding 352 observations 
b The 95% confidence interval  for kurtosis  under the null hypothesis of normality is 
(2.55, 3.45) 
c t(T) =mean/~/(variance/~ 
d 5' =  2(#  observations below mean-T/2)/~T ~ N(O,  1) if T ~  oo 
e  j  =  T(skewness2/6 +  (kurtosis -  3)2/24) ~ X2(2) if T -, oo 
f  In part II, 478 observations are used for Belgium, as only 10 realignments fall in the 
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so, though, for the British pound-effectively floating against the Dutch 
guilder-and the Danish krone. 
The t-test-which should be interpreted with care due to the observed 
non-normality 8-shows a highly  significant  value for Italy, suggesting 
that borrowing  in a low-interest country like the Netherlands and invest- 
ing in a high-interest country like Italy yields, on average, a significantly 
positive return.  In percentages per year-multiplying the means in the 
table  by 52-the excess  return on investing  in  Italy with  money bor- 
rowed in the Netherlands would have been almost 3.5 percent between 
April 1979 and May 1990. 
In part II of Table 1  A, the same statistics are displayed but now with the 
realignment weeks excluded.  As can be seen, the omission of about 2 
percent of all observations leads to a large decline in the degree of non- 
normality for France and Italy: both kurtosis and skewness are reduced 
considerably.  For these two countries, which have experienced  large- 
scale  devaluations,  the  return variance  also  decreases  considerably, 
illustrating the large impact of a few outlier realignment  returns on the 
overall variance. 
Part  II  shows  that  borrowing  in  the  Netherlands  and  investing  in 
either  France or Italy would have been a profitable  strategy, provided 
one could have  forecasted the weeks in which realignments took place. 
Withdrawing  one's investment at the beginning of the realignment week 
and coming back afterwards would have yielded 2.61 percent (France) 
and 4.75 percent  (Italy) on an annual basis, respectively. 
Part III of Table 1A is concerned with the return distributions from Au- 
gust 1983 onward.  Although non-normality is severe again, significantly 
positive returns could have been made- even without knowledge about 
the precise timing  of realignments-in Italy and Denmark and, though 
with  less confidence,  in  France and  Belgium.  The annual  return  on 
Danish investments, for example, equals almost 3 percent:  In Tables 
1B and 1C, total returns are split up in the exchange rate change and 
the nominal interest differential, respectively.  Note that all high-interest 
EMS countries-Belgium,  Denmark, France and Italy-have, on aver- 
age,  depreciated  against the guilder  both over the whole  period  and 
over the second sub-period,  but not as much as the average interest 
differential with the Netherlands would  have predicted.  The variability 
of the interest rate differential is almost negligible when compared  with 
the variance  of exchange  rate changes.  This  latter variance  in  fact 
determines the significance  of the mean return. 
Table IA confirms this conclusion.  The computed total return varian- 
ces are approximately  equal to the variance of exchange rate changes. 
Note, moreover, that the variability of returns has significantly decreased 
from the first to the second sub-period.  For France, Italy and Germany, 
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Table lB. Statistics for weekly exchange rate changes (% per week)  a 
I. Period April 1979-May 1990 (580 observations) 
mean  variance  skewness  kurtosis  t-test  S-test  J-test 
FF  -0.0589  0,2623  -5.697  61.61  -2.77  3.32  86,151.61 
IL  -0.0788  0.3133  -2.207  22.71  -3.39  3.57  9,855.76 
DM  0.0074 0.0622  0.252  8.14  0.71  0.66  645,27 
BP  -0.0522  1.2665  -0.303  4.71  -1.12  1.66  79.37 
BF  -0.0444  0.6814  0.120  9.22  -1.19  1.36  787,68 
II. Period August 1983-May 1990 (352 observations) 
mean  variance  skewness  kurtosis  t-test  S-test  J-test 
FF  -0.0316  0.1150  -3.624  40.10  -1.75  2.13  20,962.94 
IL  -0.0592  0.1819  -2.193  15.66  -2.60  2.03  2,632.37 
DM  0.0011  0.0342  6.130  9.77  0.11  0.85  672.02 
BP  -0.1046  1.0997  -0.305  4.78  -1.87  1.92  52.06 
BF  -0.0063  0.2508  -0.331  7.34  -0.24  0.64  283.11 
DK  -0.0150  0.0912  -0.300  3.66  -0.93  0.53  11.73 
For notation and symbols, see table 1A. 
variance.  The decrease in Belgian return variance is even greater.  Only 
for Britain,  little  change  is seen, as could  be expected for a formally 
floating currency.  The reduction in average interest differentials, on the 
other hand, has been far less (as shown in Table  1C), thus leading to 
significantly positive mean returns after 1983 in particular.  We elaborate 
on this point in Section 3. 
For the Dutch-German relation, the reverse is the case:  the deprecia- 
tion of the guilder as predicted by the interest differential has not been 
fully realized.  No simple  profitable strategy appears to exist between 
Dutch and German investments. 
2.  Speculative Strategies around Realignments 
In  this  section,  we  investigate  the  potential for  speculative  gains  by 
borrowing  in weak currencies and investing  in strong currencies over 
a week including an EMS realignment.  Because of the one-sided de- 
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Table IC. Statistics  for weekly interest rate differentials  (% per week)  a 
I. Period April 1979--May 1990 (580 observations) 
mean  variance  skewness  kurtosis  t-test  S-test  J-test 
FF  0.0843  0.0233  11.723  175.78  13.29  9.14  734,701.51 
IL  0.1458  0.0073  3.068  19.79  41.20  3.74  7,723.86 
DM  -0.0130  0.0004  -0.717  13.55  16.07  2.08  2,741.48 
BP  0.0868  0.0009  -0.931  4.74  69.96  1,08  157.11 
BF  0.0714  0.0069  6.945  75.49  19.00  5.79  110,768.33 
II. Period August 1983-May 1990 (352 observations) 
mean  variance  skewness  kurtosis  t-test  S-test  J-test 
FF  0.0622  0.0010  1.695  9.82  36.63  3.41  850.41 
IL  0.1200  0.0021  0.995  4.70  49.68  3.52  100.55 
DM  -0.0134  0.0001  0.359  4.35  -24.54  1.71  34.33 
BP  0.0913  0.0005  -0.194  2.16  74.64  0.32  12.60 
BF  0.0500  0.0011  3.293  28.21  28.65  5.44  9,954.96 
DK  0.0714  0.0007  0.264  2.75  52.32  0.85  5.02 
a For notation and symbols, see table 1A. 
to the  interest  differential  between the weak currency and the strong 
one  at the time the  investment  takes  place,  while the  potential  gain 
appears virtually  unlimited  and  depends on whether the  realignment 
indeed occurs and on the magnitude of the parity adjustment and the 
corresponding change in the market rate of exchange. 
Theoretically,  the uncovered  interest differential should reflect the ex- 
pected  change  in  the  exchange  rate  over  the  deposit  maturity.  Of 
course,  a  risk  premium  may also  account for  part of this differential. 
As both the expected  exchange rate change and the risk premium are 
unobservable,  however,  the two cannot  be empirically  distinguished. 
One reason for such risk premia-as suggested  by De Grauwe (1989) 
and Giavazzi  and Giovannini  (1989)-could  be the iUiquidity and cor- 
responding excess  variability  of Euro-markets  in the early  eighties  for 
some of the weaker EMS currencies  due to domestic capital  controls. 
Even  if true,  this source of risk should  have been  greatly  reduced  in 
recent  years since  markets  have steadily  become more liquid.  More- 
over,  Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  (1989) document the  behaviour  of the 
Euro-term  structure  around the 1983 and 1986 realignments  and con- 
clude that expectational  effects  probably dominate risk premia.  Here, 
we abstract from a specification  of risk premia and focus on the mean- 
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In Table 2  we list the sequence  of EMS  realignment dates,  which  all 
have  taken  place  during  a  weekend 7  in  an  attempt  by the  monetary 
authorities  to  prevent  speculation  in  financial  markets.  The  only  ex- 
ception to this pattern  is the unilaterally announced  devaluation  of the 
Danish  krone on Thursday  night, e November 29,  1979. 
Official parity changes are expressed  here as the percentage change 
of a  currency  against the  Dutch  guilder,  although  it may  consist  of a 
revaluation  of the  guilder  against  its  parity  and  a  devaluation  of the 
other  currency  against  its own  parity.  For comparison,  the  observed 
change in the market rate of exchange from the Wednesday preceding 
the realignment weekend to the Wednesday following this weekend and 
the 7-day  interest differential over the same  period  are also displayed 
in Table 2.  Their sum is shown as the total weekly return over an open 
position  in foreign currency.  The same  information  is provided for the 
week  starting  the  Friday  before  the  realignment,  to  informally  assess 
whether this difference  in timing significantly influences the results. 
Table 2.  Realignment periods  (all returns in % per week) 
A. France  Wednesday to Wednesday  Friday to Friday 
Date  Parity  ~  iY r  -  i "1  total  ~  if r  -  i nl  total 
DG/FF  return  return 
Change 
24-  9-79  -  0.603  0.035  0.638  0.517  0.413  0.558 
30-11-79  -  -0.597  0.009  -0.588  -0.503  -0.019  -0.522 
23-  3-81  -  0.087  0.028  0.115  0.094  0.025  0.119 
5-10-81  -8.5  -5.145  0.558  -4.588  -5,013  0.294  -4.719 
22-  2-82  -  -0.200  0.065  -0.135  -0.247  0.071  -0,176 
t4-  5-82  -10,0  -6.239  0.456  -5.783  -5.126  0.228  -4.899 
21-  3-63  -6.0  -3.336  2.650  -0.586  -2.721  2.772  0.051 
20-  7-65  -  0.186  0.057  0.243  0.055  0.054  0,110 
6-  4-86  -6.0  -3.529  0,287  -3.242  -0.700  0.125  -0.576 
2- 8-86  -  -0.182  0.034  -0,148  0.139  0.027  0.156 
12-  1-87  -3.0  -0.071  0.108  0.037  -0.511  0.074  -0.438 
7-  1-90  -  0.348  0.044  0.392  0.224  0.038  0.262 
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Table 2.  (continued) 
B. Italy 
Date  Parity 
DG/IL 
Change 
Wednesday to Wednesday 
i i¢  -  i '~1  total 
return 
Friday to Friday 
i #  -  i nz  total 
return 
24-  9-79  -  -1.055  0.058  -0.996  -0.287  0.075  -0.212 
30-11-79  -  -0.456  0.019  -0.437  0.336  -0.008  0.327 
23- 3-81  -6.0  -1.934  0.121  -1.813  -3.241  0.118  -3.123 
5-1 0-81  -8.5  -5.429  0.545  -4.884  -3.765  0.264  -3.501 
22-  2-82  -  -0.388  0.154  -0,224  -0.704  0.178  -0.528 
14-  6-82  -7.0  -1.781  0.211  -1.570  -1.605  0.228  -1.377 
21-  3-83  -6.0  0.733  0.876  1.810  2.233  0.410  2.643 
20- 7-85  -8.0  -3.373  0.095  -3.278  4.019  0.082  4.101 
6-  4-86  -3.0  -0.929  0.211  -0.718  1.737  0,159  1.896 
2-  8-66  -  -0.047  0.091  0.044  -0.251  0.067  -0.164 
12-  1-87  -3.0  -1.283  0.200  -1.082  -0.499  0.200  -0.298 
7-  1-90  -3.7  0.304  0.003  0.367  0.685  0.063  0.748 
C. Germany 
Date  Parity 
DG/DM 
Change 
Wednesday to Wednesday 
i w9 -  i nl  total 
return 
Friday to Friday 
i w9 -  i nl  total 
return 
24-  9-79  -~2.0  0.797  -0.057  0.740  0.344  -0.051  0.292 
30-11-79  -  -0,775  -0.056  -0,830  -0.525  -0.089  -0.614 
23-  3-81  --  0.141  0.024  0.165  0.285  0.008  0.292 
5-10-81  --  -0.541  -0,005  -0.546  -0.639  -0.016  -0.655 
22- 2-82  -  0.210  -0.004  0.206  -0,024  -0.005  -0.029 
14-  6-82  -  -0.162  0.002  -0.160  -0.273  0.000  -0.273 
21 -  3-83  -{-2.0  0.787  0.008  0.795  1.240  0.012  1.251 
20- 7-85  -  -0,027  -0.026  -0.054  0.377  -0.026  0.351 
6- 4-86  --  0.050  -0.016  0.034  -0.190  -0.018  -0,208 
2-  8-86  --  0.038  -0.010  0.028  -0.124  -0.018  -0.142 
12-  1-87  -  0.208  -0.024  0.184  -0.242  -0.024  -0.266 
7-  1-90  -  -0.013  -0.001  -0.014  -0.135  -0.023  -0.158 
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Table 2.  (continued) 
D. United Kingdom 
Date  Parity 
DG/BP 
Change 
Wednesday to Wednesday 
i uk  -  i nl  total 
return 
Friday to Friday 
i uk -  i nl  total 
return 
24-  9-79 
30-11-79 
23-  3-81 
5`10-81 
22-  2-82 
14-  6-82 
21-  3-83 
20-  7-85 
5` 4-86 
2-  8-86 
12-  1-87 
7-  1-90 
E. Belgium 







0.410  0.076  0.486  0.767  0,076  0.843 
-0.709  0.073  -0,636  0.500  0.045  0.045 
0,672  0.043  0,715  0,817  0.040  0.857 
-1.619  0.057  -1.562  -0.759  0.059  -0.700 
-1.461  0.072  -1.389  -0.940  0.075  -0.864 
-0.688  0.069  -0.619  0.372  0.068  0,440 
-0.755  0.112  -0,643  0.253  0.121  0,374 
0.719  0.107  0,826  0.055  0.104  0.159 
-2.119  0.112  -2,007  -1.939  0.110  -1,830 
-2,209  0.082  -2.127  -1.588  0,077  -1.512 
-2.292  0.092  -2.200  -1.575  0.091  -1.464 
0.796  0,111  0.907  1.754  0.106  1.861 
Wednesday to Wednesday 
e  i ~  -  i nl  total 
return 
Friday to Friday 
i t~ -  i nt  total 
return 
24-  9-79  -  0.719  n.a.  n.a. 
30-11-79  -  -0.788  n.a.  n,a. 
23-  3-81  -  -0.591  0.041  -0,550 
5-1 0-81  -5.5  -3.271  0.237  -3.034 
22-  2-82  -8.5  -4,423  0.099  -4.324 
14-  6-82  -4.2  -2,426  0.105  -2.321 
21.  3-83  -2,0  2.613  1,165  3.778 
20-  7-85  -  -0.152  0.038  -0.114 
6-  4-86  -2.0  1.185  0.372  1.557 
2-  8-86  -  0.025  0.032  0.057 
12-  1-87  -1.0  0.499  0,091  0.590 
7-  1-90  -  -0.061  0.027  -0.034 
0.378  n.a.  n,a. 
1.274  n.a.  n.a. 
-0.385  0,038  -0,348 
-3,259  0.257  -3,002 
-4,124  0.150  -3.974 
-3.151  0,111  -3,041 
2.163  0.478  2.641 
-1.300  0,042  -1.258 
1.875  O.  108  1.982 
0.048  0.027  0,075 
0.188  0.134  0.321 
0.8130,023  0.836 
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Table  2,  (continued) 
E Denmark  Wednesday to Wednesday  Friday to Friday 
Date  Parity  ~  i n  -  i nl  total  ~,  i n  -  i r'l  total 
DG/DK  return  return 
Change 
24-  9-79  -2.9  -1.040  n.a.  n.a.  -0.795  n.a.  n.a. 
30-11-79  -4.8  -4.809  n.a.  n.a.  -4.227  n.a.  n.a. 
23-  3-81  -  0.165  n.a.  n.a.  0.071  n.a.  n.a. 
5-1 0-81  -5.5  -2.751  n.a.  n.a.  -3.019  n.a.  n.a. 
22-  2-82  -3.0  -2.014  n.a.  n.a.  -2.047  n.a.  n.a. 
14-  6-82  -4.2  -1.761  n.a.  n.a  -0.894  n.a.  n.a. 
21-  3-83  -1.0  -1.958  n.a.  n.a.  2.776  n.a.  n.a. 
20-  7-85  -  0.234  0.060  0.294  -0,852  0.059  -0.594 
6- 4-86  -2.0  0.295  0.063  0.357  0.470  0.073  0.543 
2-  8-86  -  0.481  0.072  0.552  0.917  0.067  0.984 
12-  1-87  -3.0  -0.578  0.108  -0.470  -0,211  0.176  -0.036 
7-  1-90  -  -0.060  0.062  0.002  0.410  0.058  0.468 
Note that the returns (r) as quoted here are for an open position  in 
foreign exchange from the point of view of a Dutch investor, that is, for a 
long foreign position and a short domestic one.  Large negative returns 
thus offer support for the hypothesized  profitability of this strategy.  As 
concerns the Dutch-German relation, large positive returns suggest that 
the proposed strategy  is profitable, the Dutch guilder  being the weak 
currency in this case. 
The results in Table 2 contain a number of interesting characteristics. 
In  our  discussion,  we  first  consider the Wednesday  to  Wednesday 
results.  Then,  a comparison  is made  between starting  a speculative 
strategy the Wednesday or Friday prior to the realignment. 
First, total returns on open positions  in realignment weeks are com- 
pletely  dominated  by the  realized  exchange  rate changes.  Interest 
differentials  appear  to be small  and fairly  stable  and,  therefore,  play 
only a minor role in the total return.  The realignment of March 21, 1983 
forms  an exception  in this respect, as France purposely  drove interest 
rates up to prevent speculation. 
Second, the magnitude  of the observed exchange  rate change over 
the realignment week and, consequently, the magnitude of the total re- 
turn is determined  by two factors:  whether the country is itself involved 
in the realignment  and whether the parity adjustment  greatly exceeds 
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France presents a good example of the influence of these two factors. 
The parity rate of the French franc versus the guilder has been adjusted 
only five times during the EMS period.  For the seven realignment weeks 
in  which  the  French franc/guilder  parity was not adjusted,  the  return 
on an open position  in French francs always is small and ranges from 
-0.588 to +0.638 percent per week, with an average of 0.074.  Compar- 
ing these  seven  individual  returns with the corresponding  distribution 
of returns outside  realignment weeks in part II of Table  1A,  it is easily 
seen that they all fall  into the  95  percent  confidence  interval  around 
the mean and do not significantly  deviate from the mean  return of the 
distribution.  The evidence for the other countries is similar and we con- 
clude that returns in realignment weeks in which the relevant currency 
is not involved generally are indistinguishable from returns with respect 
to that currency in non-realignment weeks. 
When a currency is involved  in a realignment, two possibilities  exist. 
Normally, a weak EMS currency that is expected to be devalued during 
realignment  talks  is  already  moving  close  to  its  lower  bound  in  the 
EMS.  That  is,  it  is  using  most of  its  allowed  margin  fluctuations.  In 
case the announced magnitude of the realignment is of the same order 
of magnitude as its maximum fluctuation margin, no sizeable exchange 
rate change is  necessary to have the new exchange  rate move  in the 
midst or even in the upper part of its new range.  Then, the realignment 
is just a formal  confirmation  of a situation  that already exists and the 
effect of the parity adjustment on the observable exchange rate may be 
almost zero.  The total return on an open position  in that currency will 
also be quite small  in such circumstances.  The 3 percent devaluation 
of the French franc against the guilder on January 12, 1987 is illustrative 
in this  respect:  despite this devaluation,  the exchange  rate drops  by 
only 0.071  percent. 
The alternative is a devaluation  significantly exceeding the maximum 
fluctuation  margin of a currency,  as is the case for the remaining four 
devaluations of the French franc against the guilder of 8.5,  10, 6 and 6 
percent respectively,  in chronological  order.  The concurrent exchange 
rate changes in these four weeks range from -3.336 percent to -5.145 
percent.  Note,  however, that even then the change  in the market rate 
of exchange is considerably  less than the parity change. 
As significantly negative returns on an open position in French francs 
are observed in these weeks, our chosen strategy here, to take an open 
position  in  guilders  using  borrowed  French  francs,  would  have  been 
quite  profitable.  Obviously, the interest differential  in favour of France 
most  of the  time  has  been  insufficient  to  prevent  such  speculation. 
Although  France has been used as an example throughout, the same 
holds for the realignments of the guilder versus the other currencies. BETTING ON THE EMS  163 
The  Friday  to  Friday  results,  in  general,  are  comparable  to  the 
Wednesday to Wednesday ones.  Total returns are similarly  dominated 
by exchange  rate changes,  with interest  rate differentials  being small 
and relatively stable.  Interest differentials  do not consistently  rise from 
the Wednesday to the  Friday  prior to  realignment,  and,  thus,  do  not 
reflect increasing  realignment  fears towards the weekend.  Changes in 
market  rates  of exchange  in  most  instances  only  marginally  depend 
on whether the  investment  strategy  is implemented  on Wednesday or 
Friday. 
Noteworthy is the fact  that  in  a few exceptional  cases,  speculating 
on  devaluations  of  weak  currencies  turns  against  investors  using  a 
Friday  to  Friday  investment  period.  Examples  are the  realignment of 
July 20,  1985 for Italy and of April  6,  1986 for France.  In both cases, 
the so-called  weaker currency strongly appreciates  versus the guilder 
in the realignment  week despite  a large downward parity  adjustment. 
This yields  a considerable  loss on the investment.  The explanation  of 
this phenomenon may be found in an occasionally  strong  depreciation 
of  weaker currencies  within the  EMS  band  on  the  eve  of  a  realign- 
ment.  Apparently,  realignment  fears  are  reflected  more  in  exchange 
rate changes than in  interest  differentials.  Investors  initiating  their in- 
vestment  on  Friday  are  then too  late.  Most  of the  weak currency's 
depreciation has already taken  place. 
The above  results imply that for speculating  on devaluations  of weak 
currencies  through  realignments  to  be  ex ante profitable,  an  investor 
not only would need to be able to forecast the timing of the realignment, 
but also  which currencies  would be  involved  and  of what magnitude 
the parity  adjustment would be.  Shifting from Wednesday  to Friday  in 
implementing  such  strategy  doesn't  change that conclusion.  It sug- 
gests that little additional  relevant information  has become available to 
the market between the Wednesday  and  Friday before  a realignment, 
on average. 
To assess whether the market as a whole had such forecasting  power, 
we  searched  the  Financial  Times  around  each  realignment  date  for 
additional  independent evidence.  Table 3 presents 9 evidence  on the 
earliest  date when realignment  rumors  are  mentioned  and  on the  ex 
post accuracy of the  reported  realignment  expectations.  Overall,  the 
information  suggests  that  much  uncertainty  exists  about  the  timing 
and  magnitude  of  realignments.  In  many  cases  strong  realignment 
rumors-as published  in the financial  press-,  only emerge on Friday 
or Saturday,  with the actual  realignment  occurring over the weekend. 
Consequently,  7-day interest rates observed  on Wednesday, or even on 
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Table 3.  Information on realignments from the Financial Times 
Date of  Earliest date  Stated  Realized 
Realignment  in FT  Expectations  Parity Changes 
24- 9-79  17-  9-79  speculative  DM revalued 2% 
selling of  DK devalued 2.9% 
BF+DK 
30-11-79  26-11-79  -  DK devalued 4.8% 
23- 3-81  -  -  IL devalued 6% 
5-10-81  3-10-81  revaluation DM  DM + DG revalued 5.5% 
devaluation FF  FF+IL devalued 3% 
22- 2-82 
14- 6-82  9- 6-82 
21- 3-83  17- 3-83 
20- 7-85 
6- 4-86  5- 4-86 
BF devalued 8.5% 
DK devalued 3% 
DM+DG revalued 4.25% 
FF devalued 5.75% 
IL devalued 2.75% 
DM revalued 5.5% 
DG revalued 3.5% 
DK revalued 2.5% 
BF revalued 1.5% 
FF+IL devalued 2.5% 
IP devalued 3.5% 
IL devalued 6% 
other currencies 
revalued 2% 
DM+DG revalued 3% 
BF+DK revalued 1% 
FF devalued 3% 
2-  8-86 
12-  1-87  7-  1-87 
7-  1-90  6-  1-90 
devaluation 
FF against DM 
by 10% 
speculation 





of FF against 




(3-5%);  later 
also pressure 
on BF, DK, IR IL 
IP devalued 8% 
DM+DG revalued 3% 
BF revalued 2% 
IL devalued 3.7% BETTING ON THE EMS  165 
Given this general  uncertainty about the timing  of realignments,  the 
precise currencies that will be involved and the magnitude of the parity 
adjustments-even when markets appear to be aware of the unsustain- 
ability of the existing parities-the large observed returns on speculative 
(short) positions  in weak EMS currencies over realignment weeks pro- 
vide insufficient evidence about the ex ante profitability of speculating 
on devaluations  of the weak currencies through realignments. 
Moreover, any profitable strategies that may have existed over these 
weekly realignment  periods  in the early years of the EMS most likely 
have been eliminated  in more recent years, for various reasons.  First, 
Table 2 shows  that the magnitude  of parity  changes  has decreased 
after  1983, with  correspondingly smaller  returns  on  open  positions. 
Second, the frequency of realignments has declined, which has further 
decreased the attractiveness of the proposed  strategy. 
3.  Borrowing Low, Investing High 
An alternative strategy to consider is to borrow in low-interest currencies 
and to invest the borrowed money in high-interest currencies. 1° In fact, 
this is exactly the reverse strategy of the first one.  Obviously, this strat- 
egy will be more successful in periods without significant realignments 
than in realignment  periods. 
One advantage  of this strategy-if at all profitable-is that it can be 
applied  much  more  often.  With the current  scarcity  of realignments 
within  the EMS, speculating  on a  large downward  parity  adjustment 
of the weak  EMS currencies  will make sense on rare occasions  only. 
Speculating  that no  large  changes  in  market  rates of exchange  will 
happen,  on the other hand,  may  be  interesting for  longer  and more 
frequent periods. 
Table 1 contains the empirical evidence that "borrowing  low, investing 
high" has been a profitable strategy for some countries.  Disregarding 
complications caused by the non-normality of the distribution of returns, 
the conclusion is that the mean return over the whole  EMS period  is 
significantly  positive for Italy and equal to 3.5 percent annually.  Con- 
sidering the period from August 1983  to May 1990, significantly positive 
mean  returns  are observed  for Italy (3.2 percent),  Denmark  (2.9 per- 
cent) and (marginally)  France (1.6 percent) and Belgium (2.3 percent). 
By excluding the realignment weeks from the calculations, a mean pos- 
itive return  (2.6 percent)  is also present for France over the compJete 
1979-1990 period.  The Italian mean excess return then increases from 
3.5 percent to 4.75 percent. 166  KOEDIJK AND KOOL 
3.1  The Information in Interest Rate Differentials 
Now we extend the analysis and investigate whether the incorporation 
of the current  interest differential as an explanatory variable  is of any 
help in developing  a profitable investment strategy.  11 The interest rate 
differential is known before the investment strategy is implemented and, 
thus, may be viewed as an indicator of future developments. 
For each country, we regress the total weekly return on an intercept, 
the interest rate differential and the lagged endogenous variable.  This 
last term  is  added to  correct  for  serial correlation,  which  otherwise 
would be present in a number of regressions.  Note that in an efficient 
market and in the absence of risk premia, uncovered interest rate parity 
should hold on average. Then, the interest rate differential should have 
no significant forecasting  power for the total return. 
Table 4 shows the regression results both for the whole period 1979- 
1990 and the second sub-period  1983-1990.  To circumvent the noted 
non-normality problem, t-ratios are calculated on the basis of heteroske- 
dastic-consistent  estimates of the standard deviation of the estimated 
coefficients) 2, Because of the inclusion of the lagged endogenous vari- 
able, the standard  Durbin-Watson statistic is unreliable.  Moreover, the 
computation  of Durbin's  h-statistic breaks down in every single  case 
because it requires the square root of a negative number. As an alterna- 
tive, we regressed the regression's residual on the original explanatory 
variables and the lagged  residual.  A standard t-test on the coefficient 
of this lagged residual is asymptotically equivalent to Durbin's h. 13 This 
t-value  is given  in the last column  of Table 4.  For the whole  period, 
the bilateral interest differential has explanatory power for the German 
mark, British  pound and  Belgian franc.  For only the  German  mark, 
the lagged  return  is significant.  After August  1983, both the interest 
differential and the lagged  return are significant for the German mark, 
Belgian franc and Danish krone.  The regression explaining the Dutch- 
German  return  has an  unexpectedly  high  explanatory  power  of over 
20 percent.  Note that the test on serial correlation of the residuals still 
signals two cases in which autocorrelation  is present. 
Table 5 contains results for the same set of regressions with all realign- 
ment weeks and the weeks immediately following  a realignment week 
excluded.  This way, the impact of outlier events due to realignments 
is removed. 
The explanatory power of both interest differentials and lagged returns 
considerably  increases.  The interest rate differential is insignificant for 
the British pound regression in the second  sub-period  only, while the 
lagged return is insignificant for the British pound and Italian lira in the 
second sub-period.  In all other cases, at least 10 percent significance 
is observed.  Again, significant autocorrelation of the residuals remains 
in a number of instances, probably due to the non-normality of the data. BETTING ON THE EMS  167 
Table 4.  The information in interest differentials  a 
I. April 1979-May 1990  (579 observations) 
Currency  intercept  interest  lagged  ~2  see  t b 
differential  return 
FF  0.03  -0.0001  -0.05  -0.001  0.488  -1.47 
(1.10)  (0,0004)  (0.90) 
IL  -0,03  0.71  -0.09  0.015  0.557  -2.04 
(0.42)  (1.27)  (1.31) 
DM  0.03  2.84  -0.21  0.067  0.243  -0.08 
(2.07)  (3.62)  (3.18) 
BP  -0,39  4.87  0.09  0.025  1.114  0.04 
(2.78)  (2.97)  (1.81) 
BF  -0.15  2.56  -0.10  0.066  0.815  -0.21 
(3.76)  (4.40)  (1.32) 
II. August 1983-May 1990  (351 observations) 
Currency  intercept  interest  lagged  ~2  see  t b 
differential  return 
FF  0.08  -0.66  -0.13  0.016  0.427  0.16 
(0.65)  (0.32)  (1.36) 
IL  -0.02  0.62  0.06  0.003  0.165  -0.35 
(0.26)  (1.28)  (0.71) 
DM  0.03  3.88  -0.44  0.215  0.165  -1.35 
(2.02)  (3.41)  (5.46) 
BP  -0.30  3.17  0.05  0.002  1.050  0.36 
(1.49)  (1.34)  (0.73) 
BF  -0.10  3.10  -0.33  0.131  0.472  -1.73 
(i .89)  (2.80)  (3.63) 
DK  -0.12  2.62  -0.17  0,058  0.297  -2.50 
(2.80)  (4.52)  (2.60) 
a t-values in parentheses 
b t is a test-statistic on first-order autocorrelation of the residuals 
Overall,  the  results  in  Tables  4  and  5  suggest  that  interest  rate  dif- 
ferentials  have  some forecasting  power.  Table  5  indicates  that,  once 
realignment weeks are excluded, returns respond proportionally or even 
more than proportionally to interest rate differentials.  Again,  the issue 
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Table 5.  The information  in interest differentials (excluding realignment weeks)  a 
I. April  1979-May  1990 (555 observations) 
Currency  intercept  interest  lagged  ~2  see  t b 
differential  return 
FF  -0.02  1.06  -0.23  0.136  0.324  -1.41 
(0.87)  (4.74)  (3.54) 
IL  -0.64  1.05  -0.21  0.065  0.471  -2.40 
(1.02)  (4.53)  (2.83) 
DM  0.02  2.30  -0.25  0,072  0.233  -1.39 
(1.64)  (3.30)  (3.73) 
BP  -0.37  4.82  0.10  0,026  1.113  -0.03 
(2.52)  (2.84)  (1.90) 
BF  -0.10  2.13  -0.15  0,044  0.763  -0.25 
(2.41)  (2.98)  (1.89) 
I1. August 1963-May  1990 (341 observations) 
Currency  intercept  interest  lagged  ~2  see  t b 
differential  return 
FF  0.06  1.84  -0.23  0.069  0,277  -0.67 
(2,01)  (4.22)  (1.82) 
IL  -0.02  0.90  -0.09  0.010  0.383  -0.09 
(0.41)  (2.06)  (1.15) 
DM  0,04  3.72  -0.45  0.210  0.166  -2.09 
(2.01)  (3,22)  (5.24) 
BP  -0,30  3.39  0.05  0.003  1.038  0.31 
(1.49)  (1,42)  (0.76) 
BF  -0,06  2,45  -0.33  0.112  0,474  -2,08 
(0.99)  (1.73)  (3.46) 
DK  -0.13  2.76  -0.19  0.064  0.295  -2.20 
(3.06)  (4.82)  (2.87) 
a ~-values in parentheses 
b t is a test-statistic  on first-order autocorrelation of the residuals 
The evidence in Table 4 suggests that the German  mark-Dutch  guilder 
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contained  in  the  interest  rate  differentials  and  lagged  returns.  No 
knowledge of the realignment timing appears required in this case. 
4.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have empirically investigated two speculative  strategies 
using 7-day Euro-currency deposits in EMS currencies.  The analysis 
is  based  on  weekly  data  from  April  1979  to  May  1990.  First,  we 
discuss the potential  of speculating  on a currency's devaluation at a 
realignment date by borrowing in a weak EMS currency,  investing  the 
money in  a strong  EMS currency and  reversing  the investment  after 
the realignment. 
Summarizing the evidence on the speculative  returns  in realignment 
weeks,  we conclude that occasionally large  returns  on the proposed 
strategy are  realized.  In general,  however, great uncertainty  has  ex- 
isted both about the timing and the magnitude of relative parity adjust- 
ments.  Often,  strong  rumors of realignment only surface just prior to 
the realignment  weekend,  though  EMS tensions  may have  prevailed 
long before.  Wednesday-and  even Friday-notations of 7-day Euro- 
interest rates, therefore,  may contain only limited information  about next 
weekend's realignments. 
Interest rate movements as measured here certainly have not been ex- 
cessive.  If anything, interest rates have moved too little to compensate 
for exchange rate changes induced by announced parity adjustments. 
Especially  in the first  years of the  EMS, therefore,  speculative  gains 
could  have  been  made  by borrowing  in the weak currencies  and  in- 
vesting  in the strong  ones,  provided a parity  adjustment of the weak 
currency considerably exceeding the fluctuation  margin was expected. 
The evidence on the  uncertainty surrounding  realignments,  however, 
throws doubt on the market's ability to effectively forecast realignments 
and exploit this strategy. 
Moreover,  this  speculation  possibility  has  been  virtually eliminated 
from  the  system  since  1983.  Most  of the  subsequent  realignments 
have been of a relatively small magnitude,  insufficient to generate large 
returns.  The frequency of realignments  has also declined, reducing the 
scope for this strategy. 
The second strategy we have investigated  is "borrowing low, investing 
high."  For  each  of the  weaker  EMS  countries-Belgium,  Denmark, 
France and Italy-the mean return on open positions in foreign currency 
has  been  (marginally)  significantly  positive  after  August  1983, even 
including realignment weeks.  The same result is also obtained for Italy 
over the whole period 1979-1990.  This  provides suggestive  evidence 
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at least some EMS countries.  For West Germany and the U.K., on the 
other hand, average returns are insignificant. 
Obviously,  realignment periods in which the foreign  currency is de- 
valued  reduce the profitability of this strategy.  Excluding  realignment 
weeks leads to significantly positive returns over the whole EMS period 
for France, too.  For Italy, the results improve considerably.  Again,  no 
positive returns are found for Germany and the U.K. 
The interest differential on 7-day Euro-deposits which is known before 
the strategy is  implemented,  also appears to  have some explanatory 
power for most countries.  For France and Italy this is true only when 
realignment weeks are excluded, both over the whole period-and after 
1983.  For Belgium,  Denmark, Germany and the U.K., significant inter- 
est rate coefficients  are found whether or not realignment weeks  are 
included.  The relation may be unstable for the U.K. as the significance 
vanishes in the second sub-period. 
In addition, lagged returns contain significant information.  This is true 
for almost all countries both over the whole period and the second sub- 
period when realignment weeks are excluded.  Italy and the U.K. in the 
second period are the exceptions.  With  realignment weeks  included, 
the lagged return effect is significant for Germany and, in the second 
period,  for  Belgium  and  Denmark.  The  negative  coefficient  on  the 
lagged  return implies an oscillatory movement of the return.  Only for 
the U.K. is this coefficient positive. 
Summarizing,  our results suggest that consistently implementing  a 
"borrowing  low, investing high" strategy would have resulted in signif- 
icantly positive returns in some cases even without information  about 
the timing of realignments.  Being able to forecast realignments would 
have improved the results.  The information in interest differentials can 
also contribute to better forecasts of future returns for some currencies. 
In  a  sense,  our  results  may  underestimate  the  profitability  of the 
strategy.  Assuming it is easier to determine a priorithat  over a relatively 
short future period no realignment is likely than to precisely predict when 
a  new realignment will  occur, the strategy may be implemented  over 
relatively quiet periods in the EMS.  Moreover,  an investor engaging  in 
this  strategy  may  leave  the  end  point of  his  strategy  undetermined. 
Rolling over his investment every week enables him to stop as soon as 
he thinks the odds are  becoming  less favourable,  resulting  in  higher 
returns than implied by our blunt approach. 
In future research, we intend to investigate whether information avail- 
able in past interest and exchange rates may be exploited to optimally 
determine when to take open foreign positions and when to close them. 
This appears to be a promising avenue as judged by our evidence on 
the significant explanatory power of interest rates. 
One  may  wonder,  of  course,  where  the  documented  significantly BETTING ON THE EMS  171 
positive returns come from and whether they will persist.  TM Take, for ex- 
ample, the case of the Italian lira which provides the strongest evidence 
of positive returns.  A positive mean return on Italian lira has existed on 
average over the whole period, thereby violating open interest rate par- 
ity.  One would expect interest rate differentials and realized exchange 
rate movements to approximately  match if expectations are rational. 
A few escape  routes  are open.  First, Baldwin  (1990) argues  that 
even the presence of small transactions  costs may lead to a relatively 
large  inactivity  band  within  which  no arbitrage  takes  place.  Baldwin 
implements  his theoretical  model  by making  additional  assumptions 
with respect to plausible values of the model's parameters to arrive at 
the conclusion that,  in a  (semi-)fixed exchange  rate system,  interest 
differentials  between  1 and 4 percent on an annual basis may persist 
without inducing arbitrage flows.  To our knowledge,  no empirical work 
has been done yet on the practical  relevance of Baldwin's  approach. 
We do not explore this issue here. Note, though, that Table 1C docu- 
ments mean interest rate differentials around or in excess of 4 percent 
for the weak EMS currencies both for the whole period and the period 
after 1983. 
Second,  imperfect capital mobility through capital controls may ham- 
per  arbitrage  across  markets.  Although  such controls  have been  in 
effect  in  all weak  EMS countries  considered  here during  part  of the 
period,  capital  controls do  not apply to  Euro-currency  markets  and, 
therefore,  have no bearing on our results. Other inefficiencies such as 
illiquidity  are also hard to accept, especially for the later period. 
Third, the existence of risk premia may be used to justify the persistent 
positive  returns  on the weak  EMS currencies.  However, all types of 
empirical  tests so far have failed to provide evidence on the existence 
of persistent  risk premia in foreign exchange markets.  15 
The most likely explanation in our view, also expressed by Dornbusch 
(1991 ), is that the market perceives the EMS to be an unstable institution 
without sufficient credibility,  despite the proclaimed  progress  towards 
EMU and the commitment  of monetary authorities in all EMS countries 
to maintain  fixed  exchange  rates.  Our evidence  that exchange  rate 
fluctuations  within the EMS have significantly  declined  over the years 
without a corresponding  decline  in  interest  differentials-resulting  in 
significant  positive  returns  on open  positions  in weak  currencies-is 
consistent with this hypothesis. 
In that case, the (too) high interest rates in the weaker EMS curren- 
cies contain  a "peso problem"  risk premium  (Krasker 1980), reflecting 
the  perception  that exchange  rates will  not  remain fixed  indefinitely. 
A prolonged gradual  convergence  process to EMU in the absence  of 
further  realignments  may exacerbate this problem.  Now that the EC 
member countries have agreed on a specific deadline for the transition 172  KOEDIJK AND KOOL 
to EMU (January 1, 1999), speculation may increase over time that the 
fundamentally  weak EMS countries will not succeed  in reaching  suffi- 
cient convergence  prior to that date, thereby weakening the credibility 
of the  EMS system  as a whole.  The likely  result will  be either  higher 
interest rate differentials  or more frequent  realignments  forced  on the 
monetary authorities  by the market, or both. is 
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Notes 
1. Bilson and Hsieh (1987) present related empirical evidence using a portfolio ap- 
proach for the period 1980--1984. More recent work by Giavazzi  and Giovannini 
(1989), Giovannini (1990, 1991) and Dornbusch (1991) also investigates this issue 
in an informal way. 
2. Alternatively,  this strategy may be thought of as engaging in a one week forward 
exchange contract,  going long  (buying)  forward Dutch  guilders and going short 
(selling) forward Italian lira. 
3. We prefer Euro-currency interest rates to domestic ones as they are not subject to 
capital restrictions,  are more homogeneous and are available  for shorter maturities. 
4. During most of the sample period, a  dual-exchange market was in operation in 
Belgium: the "official" market (for current account transactions)  and the =financial" 
market.  The exchange rate determined on the latter  is the relevant one for our 
purpose and is used in the computations. 
5. The S-statistic  is a non-parametric Sign test, to be used to test the null hypothesis 
that a population median is zero.  It has a binomial distribution and in the limit 
approaches normality (Newbold 1988).  The ,/-statistic  is known as the Bowman- 
Shelton test for normality and may be found in Jarque and Bera (1980). 
6. We nevertheless feel that the reported t-ratios may be quite reliable, as aggregating 
weekly returns  to  bi-weekly or even monthly returns  considerably reduces non- 
normality, while at the same time increasing the magnitude of the t-ratios.  With 
respect to monthly returns  for Denmark over the period 1983-1990, for instance, 
normality cannot be rejected  and the t-ratio equals 3.94. 
7. In  a  number of cases,  negotiations lingered on  until Monday morning before a 
consensus was reached. 
8. To account for this,  =Thursday to Thursday" interest  and exchange rates are used 
in Table 2  under the heading =Friday to Friday" for the realignment of November BETTING ON THE EMS  173 
29, 1979. 
9. A more detailed appendix including abstracts from the Financial Times is available 
from the authors on request. 
10. This point is sometimes referred to as the Waiters critique of the EMS (see Waiters 
1990, ch. 5). 
11. Alternative explanatory variables include the slope of term structure and conditional 
second  moments.  These are left for future research. 
12. All regressions are computed  using standard TSP routines, which make use of the 
method suggested  by White (1980) to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
13. See Johnston (1972). 
14. Informal evidence on the profitability of "borrowing  low, investing high" is provided 
by Giovannini (1990, 1991) for both monthly and yearly returns of the Italian lira and 
French franc versus the German mark. 
15. For  a  discussion  of this point,  we  refer to  Giavazzi and  Giovannini  (1989) and 
Giovannini (1990). 
16. See also Froot and Rogoff (1991) for a similar analysis. 
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